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THE LEGAL HISTORY OF CREDIT IN
FOUR THOUSAND YEARS (OR LESS)
Michael L. Starzec*
It is easier to write about money than to acquire it; and those who gain it make
great sport of those who only know how to write about it. - Voltaire 1

I. IN THE BEGINNING, THERE WAS CREDIT. . .

A

rcheologists record the oldest known medium of currency as
a 3,600-year-old clay tablet, found in Mesopotamia, which
entitled the bearer to receive a quantity of barley at harvest time
from a man named Amil-mirra. 2 Generally, it’s wise to defer to
Indiana Jones, especially when one’s life depends on knowing
which cup is the Holy Grail. Since my life is not in the balance, I
can feel safe in disagreeing with Indy and asserting that a tablet
is not money: it’s a contract. But more specifically, a contract
based on credit: the bearer supplied goods in the past relying on
repayment in the future. Using terms with which we are familiar,
the holder of the tablet was the creditor while Amil-mirra, was
the debtor. Thus, it could be said this unwieldy chunk of rock
may actually be the first credit card.
From our modern perspective, it may be surprising to
recognize the concept of credit has existed since the dawn of
civilization. Yes, the contract is graven in stone. Yes, the contract
amounted to barter. Regardless of the context, it is inescapable
that people were peaceably trading and basing those transactions
on credit. This is not surprising. As Adam Smith noted, man
seemed born with a “propensity to truck, barter and exchange one
Attorney at Law, on behalf of the Illinois Creditors Bar Association
www.ilcba.org, Mr. Starzec is the manager of litigation at Blitt and Gaines,
P.C.
1
VOLTAIRE, THE WORKS OF VOLTAIRE. A Contemporary Version. A
Critique and Biography by John Morley, notes by Tobias Smollett, trans.
William F. Fleming 21 vols. Vol. VI. Part II, p. 13 (New York: E.R. DuMont,
1901).
2
NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 28 (Penguin Grp. 2008).
*
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thing for another.” 3 In the same way, it has been man’s nature to
regulate those transactions.
Even Amil-mirra’s transaction was regulated, under
Hammurabi’s Code, famously known for the principle of Lex
Talonis, an eye for an eye, interest rates were regulated and
creditors were actually forbidden to seize a debtor’s assets as
restitution. 4 In fact, under the Code, if a creditor seized grain or
livestock, not only must the creditor return it, but his illegal
action forfeited his claim. 5
While this seems enlightened, the reason for this liberality
is somewhat less than progressive. In ancient times, debt was not
secured by property or wealth: The debtor was security. Thus, if
you could not pay, the creditor made you a debt-slave for a
proscribed period of time to work off the obligation. That being
said, a potential debt-slave could avoid servitude, by nominating
his wife, kids or a slave to work it off. 6 As the Code artfully puts
it: “If any one fail to meet a claim for debt, and sell himself, his
wife, his son, and daughter for money or give them away to
forced labor: they shall work for three years in the house of the
man who bought them, or the proprietor, and in the fourth year
they shall be set free.” 7 Undoubtedly, this made for
uncomfortable Thanksgiving dinners.
Obviously, lugging around rocks as contracts was not
particularly efficient. Neither was it particularly easy to transact
business. But man would find ways to make business easier. In
fact, it can be said the story of mankind is the story of a steady
evolution making trade simpler and more efficient. Likewise,
throughout history, regulation evolved: sometimes helping that
process and sometimes hurting it.

II. MAKING MONEY
It did not take long for man to devise a more portable
medium of exchange: money. Money not only eliminates the need
to tote around your wares and then chisel the deal into slabs of
3
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS13 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976)
4
Hammurabi’s
Code
of
Laws,
L.W.
King
Trans.,
http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/hammurabi.htm (last visited Sept. 26,
2013).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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rock, it allows for efficient calculations of value, contracts to take
place over greater distances and time, and creates a means of
storing wealth that will not rot or spoil.
Initially, commodities themselves were a form of money,
each culture creating their measures of value based on what
mattered to them. Chocoholics might be pleased to know the
Aztecs actually used cacao seeds as money, an interesting choice
given historical records showing the Aztecs possessed gold in
enough abundance to attempt to bribe Cortes, an unfortunate act
which only served to fuel his greed. 8 But, as noted, the value of
the seeds as ‘money’ was limited to the Aztec culture; European
pirates seized a ship which happened to be full of cacao seeds. 9
Jack Sparrow dumped it overboard, thinking it rabbit dung. 10
Likewise, I am sure both pirates and Aztecs would look at our
paper money and plastic debit cards with a jaundiced eye.
Likely due to durability, precious metals served a similar
function until governments began to mint coins. In the western
world, Herodotus credits the ancient kingdom of Lydia, located
in what is now western Turkey, as being first nation to coin
money. 11 Not that Herodotus heralded this economic revolution
with much fanfare. Disappointingly, the creation of money is
relegated an offhanded comment in a paragraph dominated by
denigrating comments about the Lydian’s predilection to
prostitution as a significant source of national revenue. 12 With
what may be the first recorded left-handed compliment,
Herodotus charitably noted the Lydian way of life was not unlike
the Greeks, “[a]part from the fact that they prostitute their
daughters.” 13
This perspective on commerce is reflective of
contemporaneous Greek attitudes. Both Plato and Aristotle
condemned charging interest. In Plato’s Laws he stated “no one
shall . . . lend upon interest; and the borrower should be under no
obligation to repay either capital or interest.” 14 Plato ascribed to
“Cortes
vs.
the
Aztecs”,
June
30,
2011, John
Keko
http://www.examiner.com/article/cortes-vs-the-aztecs
9
JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF MONEY 17 (Crown Publ’g
1997).
10
Id.
11
HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES 44 (Carolyn Dewald ed., Robin
Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
PLATO, Book V, in LAWS 9-10, Benjamin Jowett trans.,
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/laws.5.v.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
8
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the philosophy that one should only lend to one’s friends. While a
grand suggestion, not repaying your pals generally led to the
ancient practice of “unfriending.”
His student, Aristotle, took an even stronger position. To
Aristotle, there were two types of wealth-gathering: household
management and retail trade. Becoming wealthy through the
work of your own hands was “necessary and honorable.” On the
other hand, it was:
[U]nnatural . . . [for] men gain from one another. The
most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury,
which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from
the natural object of it. For money was intended to be
used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And
this term interest, which means the birth of money from
money, is applied to the breeding of money because the
offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of any modes
of getting wealth this is the most unnatural. 15
After reading that, who doesn’t want to skip the Super
Bowl and tune in for the Adam Smith versus Aristotle grudgematch debate?
Despite
Herodotus’
disparagement
and
Platonic/Aristotelian snobbery, the Lydian invention was widely
accepted and copied by governments in the region and beyond.
Government sponsorship allowed an impartial standard to be set
which also served as source of revenue: the difference of the
stated value of the coin versus the actual metal content. For
example, using modern measurements, an ounce of gold may be
worth $600.00 therefore a newly minted one ounce gold coin
should be worth $600.00. However, when ancient governments
produced the coin, they would debase it by replacing some of that
gold with another metal. It still weighed an ounce but it was not
an ounce of gold. Not surprisingly, the unused gold ended up in
the government’s pocket. 16

III. PEOPLE PREFER PROFITS TO PLATO
We have seen that the ancients, in rapid fire succession,
15
ARISTOTLE, Book 1, in POLITICS, Part X , Benjamin Jowett trans.,
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
16
DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC 27
(2nd ed. MIT Press 2005).
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created contracts, regulated creditor/debtor relationships and cast
off the last shackles of the Stone Age by creating coins. These
developments were timed almost perfectly for the rise of Rome.
With its vast size, comparable peacefulness and efficient road
network, trade over vast distances became possible.
As is well known, the Romans unashamedly ripped off the
entire Greek pantheon and its culture, contriving to cover up this
plagiarism by changing everyone’s names. That being said, the
Romans were all about practicality and not about philosophy for,
unlike the Greeks, they did not condemn commerce. Instead, they
differentiated between productive credit, used for business
growth and investment, and consumptive debt, which were
personal loans for consumer goods. 17 The former was
praiseworthy while the latter was not. In the later stages of the
Roman Empire, their views on interest were codified in
Justinian’s Code which proscribed their maximum legal rates. 18

IV. THE NEW MATH
When Rome fell, Europe fractured along warring ethnic
lines. While they may not have realized it, they had one thing in
common: the yoke of Roman numerals. Remarkably, this
remaining vestige of the empire served to stagnate the West’s
economic evolution for almost a thousand years. Roman
numerals made basic addition and subtraction cumbersome and
the calculation of interest or deprecation nearly impossible. This
changed in 1202, when Leonardo Fibonacci introduced Europe to
the Hindu-Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero in his
treatise, Liber Abaci (Book of the Abacus).19 The son of a Pisan
customs official in what is now Bejai, Algeria, Fibonacci was
exposed to this rational system of math, and mastered it. 20 But the
true genius of his mastery was his presentation of the new
theories. Rather than writing a dry collection of arithmetic
formulae, he taught concepts by way of real world business
examples, such as the computation of interest and used

17
LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 13
(Twayne Publ’g 1990).
18
DEMETRIOS GOFAS, The Byzantine Law of Interest, in THE ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF BYZANTIUM, 1095, 1096 (Angeliki E. Laiou ed., Dumbarton Oaks
2002).
19
FERGUSON, supra note 2, at 32.
20
Id.
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commodity trading as the theme for the entire work. 21 Soon
Abacus schools erupted all over northern Italy and their
graduates became the first corporate CEOs. 22
With this new knowledge, a host of complex mathematics
was made possible, leading to greater trade, greater volumes of
lending and the birth of international banking. But more than
that, it created lending structures outside of government or
church control, lending not only to those entities, but also to the
common trader and merchant. 23 This democratization of lending
was an important component in the development of Western
economic models.

V. LOSING MY RELIGION
So now, everyone could easily calculate interest but there
was a small hurdle, most governments adhered to biblical
strictures against usury or interest on loans.24 In fact, Psalm 15
asks “Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle?” In response, it is
said one of the persons who may abide in the tabernacle is one
“that putteth not out his money to usury.” 25 Ouch.
To get around issues of morality, the bankers, likely in
cahoots with lawyers, simply changed the name of their new
lending product from a loan to a “bill of exchange.” 26 A merchant
would receive their money in the form of a bill of exchange at
their local bank. 27 They would present the bill to receive their
money at a different bank in a different town, agreeing that they
would pay a slightly higher amount than the actual loan. 28 See
your Holiness? No interest! It’s just a service charge.
The salutary effect of the bills of exchange was they
removed the difficulty of the use of money, a development we just
heralded five paragraphs ago. Lighter than clay tablets, coins
were still a burden to carry about in large quantities. As result,
trade increased because this private precursor to paper money
made transactions easier and faster. No more waiting for a
RODNEY STARK, THE VICTORY OF REASON: HOW CHRISTIANITY LED
TO FREEDOM, CAPITALISM, AND WESTERN SUCCESS 108 (Random House 2005).
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id.
WEATHERFORD, supra note 10, at 72.
See Leviticus 25:36-7 and Ezekiel 18:13.
See Psalms 15:5.
WEATHERFORD, supra note 10, at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
Id.
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delivery of gold coin, carted on the backs of mules, subject to
brigands, pirates or tolls levied by each of the feudal dominions
through which your caravan had the misfortune to travel.
Weatherford provides an excellent illustration:
In 1338, a shipment of coins required three weeks to
wend its way from Rouen . . . to Avignon . . ., a distance
of just over four hundred miles. By contrast, a bill of
exchange could be sent in a mere eight days and if it
was stolen, the thief could not redeem it. Despite the
extra cost of 8 percent to 12 percent, a bill still proved
cheaper than the cost of hiring an armed escort for a
shipment . . . Bills of exchange helped to free money
from its spatial limitations. 29
Other barriers conquered by bills were the limitation of
only lending the supply of coins on hand and reliance on a single
currency. This allowed more money to be put into use without
the need for the inflationary act of minting more coins. Soon, the
bills were exchanged in place of coins, circulating to third, fourth
and fifth parties, just like the paper money we know today.30
It was not long before government became entwined with
the production of paper money. In the United States, the first use
of paper money occurred in 1690 in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts who needed to find a way to pay for a boondoggle
attempt to capture Quebec City. 31 The paper promised
redemption in gold or silver coins and these slips were utilized in
trade alongside gold and silver coins. 32 This pre-dated the
creation of the British Central bank by four years which, from its
outset, issued paper currency backed by redemption in precious
metals. As we will see, the existence of a central bank is a
necessary prerequisite to the formation of a system of credit. 33
Like bills of exchange, this paper had value because the holder
had faith they could exchange their paper for metal. As you might
expect, convenience aided faith and ensured almost no one
cashed in their paper.

Id. at 75.
Id.
31
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 28-29.
32
Id.
33
MARION ARCHIBALD ET. AL., MONEY: A HISTORY, 177 (Jonathan
Williams ed., St. Martin’s Press 1997).
29
30
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VI. PAPER TO PLASTIC
By the 1980’s, every major government had removed their
currencies from a gold or silver standard. Therefore, unlike the
1690’s or the 1960’s for that matter, our money retains value not
because of faith in its backing by gold, but on faith alone; the
dollar is worth a dollar because we believe it is.
In the last twenty years, we have gotten even further
disconnected from associating our money with anything physical.
Old Amil-mirra thought it was pain to lug around that barley
contract. In the 21st century, we actually decided paper money
was too cumbersome. Thus, five millennia later, Amil-mirra’s
tablet was replaced by a weightless plastic card. Your money is
now digits on a computer or smart phone screen. Remember that
business transaction from Rouen to Avignon that took 8 days? It
can now be completed with a mouse click which sends invisible,
instantaneous transmissions of binary code that passes for money
and is completed in an eighth of a second.

VII. GIVE AMERICA SOME CREDIT
But where did credit cards come from? America has had
credit since its foundation. Records demonstrate installment
credit was being offered by New York furniture retailer
Cowperwaite and Sons as far back as 1807. 34 Revolving credit is
a somewhat different animal. Its roots are found in the National
Banking Act of 1863, which created nationally chartered banks
even though the first national credit cards would not be issued for
another century. Further centralizing and standardizing the
banking system was the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913.
The key component of the Reserve System was the requirement
of all nationally chartered banks to become members and thereby
be regulated by the Fed. 35 Thus, the charge plate was set.
Interestingly, for much of American history, consumer
lending was not a part of the portfolio of U.S. banks. The
merchants themselves would provide the financing for the
purchases and leave to the larger loans to the banks.36 Credit
cards stepped into the shoes of merchant lenders, allowing them
to cut costs and risk, putting those on the third-party bank. Thus,
“credit cards provided a platform that made borrowing and
34
35
36

MANDELL, supra note 17, at 14.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 28-29.
Id. at 51.
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lending small amounts of money more efficient.” 37
The modern credit card allegedly began in 1949 when
Frank McNamara, president of a credit company, realized he left
his wallet at home in the midst of meal out. 38 He called his wife
who dutifully arrived with the money. 39 This led to an epiphany
of sorts: a club card to pay for restaurant outings so that lack of
cash was not a deterrent. Extravagantly naming the initial use of
the card the “The First Supper” a legend was born. 40
Unfortunately, such grandiosity tends to diminish the credibility
of Diner’s Club’s origin.
At this time, the Diner’s Club card was made out of paper,
not plastic. In my extensive study of 1950’s and early 1960’s
culture, I’ve watched at least three seasons of Mad Men, it does
not seem it was customary for Don Draper to jam paper cards in
his pocket, hoping they wouldn’t get mangled. In other words,
the card, like Frank’s cash, would still be in his wallet and he
would still have to answer to Mrs. Frank. Further research
proved my instincts were correct: Diner’s Club was not even the
first revolving account credit card.
Credit, no pun intended, goes to the venerable department
store, Bloomingdale’s. In 1938, the store introduced what it called
a permanent budget account which allowed customers the option
of not paying off their bill every month, aggregating total
purchases into a single sum that could be paid over time at the
cost of interest charges. 41 Previous forms of credit, such as
installment payments and charge cards may not have required
payment at the time of purchase. However, the retailer did expect
full payment over six months or, with a charge card, payment in
full when billed at the end of the month.
This led to stores having credit managers who were scolds
and moralizers, reducing interest in patronizing certain retailers
due to embarrassment. 42 It was presumed wives, who generally
frequented these department stores, needed to be stopped from
their spendthrift ways, so that the haranguing credit manager
Id.
DINERS
CLUB
INTERNATIONAL,
www.dinersclubus.com/home/about/dinersclub/story?nav=left (last visited
Sept. 26, 2013).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
LOUIS HYMAN, BORROW: THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEBT 104 (Vintage
Books, 2012).
42
Id. at 99-104.
37
38
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acted in loco husbandis. 43 Contrary to this conceit, personal
experience has shown overspending is an equal opportunity issue.
Now that we know the origin of revolving credit, let us
return to Diner’s Club. In fairness, while it may not have been
the first revolving charge account, it was the first effort to forge a
universal card. Your Bloomie’s account only worked at
Bloomie’s. McNamara’s goal was to have his card operate at any
restaurant anywhere in the world. To that end, McNamara
started out recruiting restaurants and giving cards to select
individuals so that, by 1951 there were 42,000 members who paid
$18.00 a year for membership.44 Under the agreement, a member
restaurant paid 7% of the cardholder’s bill to Diner’s Club. 45
What was the restaurant owner getting out of this transaction?
The owner believed that by accepting Diner’s Club cards, they
would attract new business. 46 At the end of 1951, Diner’s Club
made $60,000 in pre-tax income. 47 By 1958, after absorbing a
competitor and moving into hotels and car rentals, gross profits
topped $40 million.48
This expansion concerned American Express. Famously
known as the issuer of traveler’s cheques, Amex saw Diner’s
Club as a danger to its travel related business. As a result, it
entered the credit card field in 1958, buying up other Diner’s
Club competitors to even the playing field as the premier highend traveler’s club. 49 They charged a higher membership fee, to
suggest it was more prestigious, but lured merchants to its banner
by offering a merchant rate 2% lower than Diner’s Club. 50
But we are still not quite at our modern credit card.
Indisputably, Diner’s Club and Amex were universal cards but
their business was not consumer loans, it was travel and dining.
The first bank to issue a general use credit card was Bank of
America to its customers in California, beginning in 1958. 51
Initially, merchants were reluctant to sign agreements to accept
this card but Bank of America made it hard to refuse when the

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 102.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 54.
MANDELL, supra note 17, at 3.
Id.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 54.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 54.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 58.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 57.
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bank mass issued the card to some 60,000 area residents. 52 By the
spring of 1959, the number of participating merchants rose from
800 to 25,000. 53 After losses of $45 million in 1960 due to a host of
issues, it turned its first profit in 1961. 54
The year 1958 saw Chase Manhattan enter the credit card
field. It hastily exited the field when selling its credit card
division to American Express in 1962.55 Seven years later, Chase
repurchased the division and joined with Bank of America,
which had begun marketing its credit card as BankAmericard. 56
Despite this bi-coastal union, both cards were regional, limited to
California and New York respectively whereas, at this stage,
both Diner’s Club and Amex were global players in their
specialized area of travel and entertainment. 57 However, bank
cards had the potential for explosive growth, they could attract a
broad range of merchants and utilized a different business model:
no membership fees and earning revenue strictly from merchant
fees and finance charges.
In 1966, BankAmericard’s in-state rivals, United
California Bank, Wells Fargo, Crocker National Bank and the
Bank of California, united to form the Interbank Card. Interbank
Card’s name changed to Mastercharge in 1969, and by 1979, was
known as Mastercard. 58 Likewise, in 1970, BankAmericard reincorporated as National BankAmericard. Four years later, the
card became accepted outside the U.S., and in light of its now
international reach, it renamed itself Visa in 1976. 59
As the two card networks expanded, they each attempted
to woo other banks: BankAmericard using a franchise system and
Interbank by offering cooperative opportunities. 60 Of the two
options, more banks preferred Interbank’s system because under
Interbank’s system, the bank marketed a jointly owned brand
rather than sublimating their identity to BankAmericard. 61 In this
Id.
Id.
54
Id. at 57.
55
Id. at 60.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
MASTERCARD,
http://www.mastercard.com/corporate/ourcompany/about-us.html (last visited
Sept. 26, 2013).
59
VISA, Corporate.visa.com/about-visa/our-business/history-of-visa.shtml
(last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
60
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 64.
61
Id.
52
53
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way, Interbank member banks could still harbor their own
dreams of national expansion if interstate banking requirements
were lifted. 62
However, under either system, members were required to
sign exclusivity agreements. For example, if a bank signed with
Visa, it was barred from offering Mastercard products. 63 This
practice subjected Visa to anti-trust concerns, which will be
discussed later in greater detail. 64 Notwithstanding this cutthroat
marketing, Visa and Mastercard actually cooperated to create
uniform operational standards for this emerging credit card
system. 65
Refusing to be subordinate to their growing competitors,
regional banks tried to create competing bank networks for their
own card. 66 For example, in Illinois, five banks created the
Midwest Bank Card, which eventually comprised a network of
600 banks in Illinois, Indiana and Michigan. 67 Despite these
efforts, the regional partnerships lacked expertise, and individual
banks reluctantly began aligning with the two growing powers. 68
This had a salutary effect of hastening standardization of
credit practice due to Visa’s and Mastercard’s previous
coordination on the architecture of the system; interoperability
became a foundation of the modern card system. 69

VIII. THE DEATH OF A SALESMAN
The birth of a national system of credit changed the
landscape of credit altogether. In the past, stores had issued the
credit. After the success of Bloomingdale’s model, other
department stores in the post-war era followed suit. 70 Yet, in the
space of a generation, an entirely new model was overtaking the
world of consumer credit. As seen by the previous section, banks,
formerly unconcerned with small-scale consumer lending, were
suddenly very interested in this line of business.
In the wake of World War II, economic and lending
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 70.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
HYMAN, supra note 37, at 106.
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incentives had changed. Returning soldiers were ready to start
families, while generous VA loans promised mortgages on homes
with almost no money down.71 Even non-veterans could enjoy
low mortgage costs via FHA loans, bought by Fannie Mae. 72
Between 1944 and 1950, housing construction exploded from
114,000 single family detached homes to 1.7 million. 73 Combined
with the creation of the federally subsidized Eisenhower highway
system, the predominantly urban landscape became a suburban
vista with 60 million people moving to the suburbs by 1980.74
Having moved from the city into a larger living space,
new homeowners were left with a problem that made retailers
salivate: additional rooms to furnish. 75 In furnishing homes,
revolving credit gave homeowners the flexibility to buy on credit
and pay at their own rate rather than having to exercise miserly
saving.76 From cars to appliances to furnishings, everything could
be bought on credit. 77 Religious and social mores about debt had
clearly changed: credit and installment lending climbed from $2.6
billion in 1945 to $103.9 billion in 1970. 78 The rise of American
economic hegemony out of the devastation of World War II
coincided with an increase in wages and optimism, a decline in
the fear of credit, and a softening of the so-called Protestant
work-ethic. 79
Therefore, a store that refused to offer credit or favored
cash over sales was subject to a competitive disadvantage. 80
Instead, most stores offered such credit, not only as an impetus to
buy but also to promote customer loyalty. 81 However, the growth
of discount chains like K-Mart and Target ate into the customer
base of high-end department stores. 82 They, too, offered credit but
with lower margins, they were eager to find someone else to bear
the costs and the risk. 83
ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO CREDIT, 37 (Basic Books 2000).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
HYMAN, supra note 37, at 76.
76
Id. 105-106.
77
Id. 96.
78
Id. at 38.
79
Id. at 34-36.
80
HYMAN, supra note 37, at 106.
81
Id. at 109.
82
HYMAN, supra note 37, at 119.
83
Id. at 139.
71
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The economic downturn of the 1970s further altered the
landscape: more shopping than ever occurred at discount rather
than department stores. 84 Department store credit was feasible in
a booming economy because it was based on quick repayment
usually six months or less, somewhat limiting the danger of store
borrowing to pay for their customer’s purchases while they
waited for repayment.. 85 However, in the economic downturn,
people were unable to afford the higher prices of department
stores and turning more strongly to discounters. 86 In order to keep
their costs low, discounters did not want to create their own card
system nor borrow money (and pay interest on that borrowing) to
fund store purchases. 87 As a result, discounters welcomed the
advent of third-party credit cards. 88 By the end of the 1970s, most
department stores were accepting national brand credit cards.
Logistically, in this new economy, the change made sense.
Most purchases were now being done on credit, and the pace was
increasing. 89 In the past, retailers provided proprietary cards, in
which the retailer was responsible for borrowing money to pay
for the customer’s purchase, relying on the hope that they would
be repaid.90 Consequently, retailers had more capital tied up in
credit loans than in merchandise. 91 Thus, when banks began
lending for consumer goods purchases, it made sense for retailers
to allow banks to take on that risk rather than assume it
themselves.

IX. DEBT CAN BE TAXING. . . EXCEPT WHEN IT’S NOT
The acceptance of credit and accumulation of debt were
not simply functions of a changing economy and social mores.
Part of the reason for this cultural change was the unforeseen
consequences of legislation.
During World War II, the federal government lowered the
tax brackets so that the middle class, formerly exempt from
taxation, was required to shoulder the burden. 92 Nonetheless, in
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 151.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 140.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 40
Id. at 119.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 123.
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making them subject to taxation, the middle class now had access
to the same tax deductions utilized by wealthy individuals and
businesses.93
In 1913, the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, creating
the income tax, allowed for the deduction of all interest. In that
era, most loans were business loans and, as such, their interest
was deductible as a business expense. 94 With the application of
the new tax code, an individual’s mortgage, credit and
installment interest were now deductible as well, giving
consumers an incentive to borrow. 95 In addition, the creation of
FHA in the 1930s led to the government—subsidized 30 year
mortgage, thereby conditioning people to accept what used to be
unacceptable: long term debt. 96
When the Sixteenth Amendment was passed, it was
presumed that few individuals would ever pay taxes. 97 Clearly, it
was not imagined that laws intended for businesses would
eventually be utilized to make a TV purchase seem like a wise tax
decision. 98 Likewise, the government planners who saw home
construction as the solution to the Depression did not consider it
might be a means to change attitudes on long term debt. 99 Nor
could the authors of the G.I. Bills that rewarded our soldiers for
their service have imagined its impact on the accumulation of
consumer debt. Like anything else, many different and seemingly
unconnected strands came together to form history, even with
something as mundane as a credit card.

X. DANCING BETWEEN THE RAINDROPS
While these programs may have helped shape a new
consumer viewpoint, what is clear is that no enabling statute
created the credit card. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the
rise of the credit card is how its legal existence was a consequence
of tangentially related laws and cases. Specifically, “[c]onsumer
credit has been subject to a large variety of legal controls. . . of
Id.
Id.
95
Id. at 124.
96
Id. at 87, 222 (arguing that the 1986 tax reform bill, which removed all
interest deductions but mortgage interest, combined with the meteoric rise in
home values, is partially to blame for the crash of 2008: consumers took out
second mortgages to pay for lavish spending and to pay-off credit cards).
97
Id. at 115.
98
Id.at 116-117.
99
Id.at 89.
93
94
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general application like the usury laws and . . . bankruptcy, fraud
and duress and some of . . . special application like the small
loans laws and the Retail Installment Sales Acts.” 100 That was
about to change.

XI. REGULATION Z
The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), passed by congress in
1968, become the first legislation to statutorily address credit
cards. The statute states,
. . .economic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions
and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer
credit would be strengthened by the informed use of
credit. The informed use of credit results from an
awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the
purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be
able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit,
and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and
unfair credit billing and credit card practices. 101
The regulations implementing the statute are codified at
12 CFR Part 226. 102 Subsection (B) of the addresses open-ended
or revolving credit card accounts. 103 Commonly, these regulations
are entitled Regulation Z.
Okay, I know you are asking the same question I did. Why
are they called Regulation Z? While I can assure you it does not
authorize creation or citizenship for zombies, there is no
explanation. Even the internet has no surmise on the origin of the
name other than an anonymous poster at Ask.com who claims it
is named Regulation Z because Z is the 26th letter of the alphabet
and these regulations were the 26th set of regulations dealing with
home mortgage financing and lending practices. 104 I am not sure
if I buy this, given that the citation in the Code of Federal
100
HOMER KRIPKE, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented
Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 445 (1968).
101
Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601 (1968).
102
Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2011).
103
Id.
104
ASK.COM, http://www.ask.com/question/why-is-it-called-regulation-z
(last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
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Regulation is 12 C.F.R. §226, not §26. Instead, considering the
dry nature of the reading, perhaps “Z” refers to their antiinsomniac applications.
Regardless of the source of its name, these rules would
serve as the primary backbone governing credit card issuers until
the 2009 Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and
Disclosure Act (CARD). 105 Under TILA, the Federal Reserve
served as the body to promulgate and administer the rules to the
credit card industry. As of July, 2011, under the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, TILA’s
general rule making authority was transferred to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, an entity created by the same act. 106

XII. IN ANTI-TRUST WE TRUST
Anti-trust laws also impacted the nature of the credit
cards we know today. As noted above, the terms of Visa’s
agreements forbade Mastercard issuing banks from issuing Visa
cards or handling transactions with Visa merchants. 107 In 1971,
Worthen Bank and Trust attempted to associate with both Visa
and Mastercard, but when Visa chose to enforce its exclusivity
agreement, the bank filed an antitrust lawsuit against Visa. 108
The case settled eventually, but Worthen’s action sparked similar
challenges to the Visa agreement from its competitors. As a result,
in 1974, Visa sought a business clearance review from the
Department of Justice for its practices. 109 When the Department
declined to hold that Visa’s exclusivity agreement was not a
violation of anti-trust laws, Visa removed all restrictions against
Visa members also offering Master Card products, thereby
ushering in the practice of dual acceptance. 110
However, Visa’s membership agreement still maintained
exclusivity agreements against other issuers. In 1989, Sears
sought membership in Visa, a request Visa refused, going so far
as to enact a membership rule that denied Visa membership to
123
STAT.
1734
Public
Law
111-24-May
22,
2009,
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ24/pdf/PLAW-111publ24.pdf
(amending the Truth in Lending Act).
106
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110201a.htm
Press Release February 1, 2011.
107
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 70.
108
Worthen Bank and Trust Co. v. Nat’l BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d
119 (8th Cir. 1973).
109
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 277.
110
Id. at 278.
105
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anyone issuing Discover or American Express cards. 111
In an effort to bypass that by-law, a Sears’ subsidiary,
SCFC ILC acquired Mountain West, a small Utah thrift
institution which possessed membership in Visa. When the small
thrift which had 5,800 Visa accounts suddenly ordered 1.5 million
Visa cards to start a new “Prime Option” credit card, Visa
refused. 112 Mountain West sued for an injunction to force
approval of the delivery of the 1.5 million cards, which was
granted in district court. Visa appealed and overturned the order,
remanding the case for further proceeding. 113 Eventually, a final
determination was reached in 1994 when the 10th Circuit found
Visa committed no anti-trust violation because the by-law did not
bar Sears from access to the credit card market. 114 Given Sears
owned Discover, there was no evidence Sears could only produce
the Prime Option Card with Visa’s help or that exclusion from a
joint venture with Visa prevented issuing the new card as a
Discover product. 115
In 1996, Wal-Mart, in a class action where it was joined
by rival Sears and nearly five million other retailers, sued Visa
and Mastercard for violations of anti-trust laws on the grounds
that it was illegal to require retailers who accepted a Visa debit
card to also accept Visa credit cards. 116 Seven years later, the case
settled for approximately $2.5 billion dollars and with Visa and
Mastercard agreeing to allow merchants to take debit cards
without being required to take credit cards. 117
Yet, even in the wake of Wal-Mart’s class action, the
concept of Visa/Mastercard duality remained unchallenged
Finally, in 2003, these practices were found to violate the law. 118
The Second Circuit dismissed arguments that the exclusionary
rules were necessary to promote cohesion between Visa and
Mastercard and that “in any event the anticompetitive effects
outweigh the procompetitive.” 119
SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa, 936 F.2d 1096, 1097 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1098.
113
Id.
114
SCFL ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 971 (10th Cir 1994).
115
Id.; In Re Visa Check/Master Money Antitrust Litigation, 96 CV 5238.
116
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 267.
117
Id. at 267.
118
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 322, 340–42 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).
119
Id. at 243; See generally, K. Craig Wildfang et al., The Persistence of
Anti-Trust Controversey and Litigation in Credit Card Networks, 73
ANTITRUST LAW 675 (studying the interaction of credit cards and anti-trust
111
112
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Most recently, Mastercard, Visa and some of the larger
banks settled another class action suit, involving about 7 million
U.S. merchants, a case centered on claims that the defendants
unlawfully conspired to fix swipe fees for merchants. 120 The
settlement was reached on behalf of a class of roughly 7 million
U.S. merchants who accept Visa and MasterCard credit cards
and debit cards. 121 In the settlement, Visa agreed to pay some $4.4
billion and Mastercard $790 million. 122 Both parties also agreed to
reduce swipe fees, fees paid by merchants to issuers for each card
use, while they retool their rules on such transactions. In addition,
retailers could now impose a surcharge for use of credit cards
(presumably assessed on the consumer) subject to caps and
disclosures.123

XIII. A PLAGUE OF PLASTIC
We have already examined the first consumer protection
rules, Regulation Z, promulgated in the wake of the passage of
TILA in 1968. Two years later, Illinois banks can be credited
with the dubious distinction of being the reason for the next set of
federal and state legislation drafted to protect consumers. 124
As mentioned above, when credit card networks began to
emerge, regional banks attempted to create their own networks
by getting cards to consumers whether they asked for them or
not.. 125 Sadly, the axiom against keeping up with the Joneses is a
cautionary tale for banks as well as consumers.
In 1966, Marine Midland Bank had tested two ways of
exhorting customer interest in its card: sending credit card
applications to some customers and actual cards to others. 126 To
laws).
JAMES O’TOOLE, Visa MasterCard Settle Antitrust Case, CNNMONEY
(July 14, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/13/news/companies/visamastercard-settlement/index.htm. discussing In Re Payment Card Interchange
Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, 05 MD 1720, United States
District Court, Eastern District of New York.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
SEAN VANATTA, The Great Chicago Christmas Credit Card Fiasco of
1966:
Echoes,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
24,
2012
5:30
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-24/the-great-chicago-christmascredit-card-fiasco-of-1966-echoes.html.
125
HYMAN, supra note 37, at 156.
126
Id.
120
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ensure an accurate measure, they controlled the distribution,
ensuring that the recipients in both groups were similarly placed
in terms of income and worth.127 In total, 33,357 applications
were sent versus 731 credit cards. 128 While the disparity in cards
versus applications was enormous, the response was entirely
reversed: only 0.7% of the applications were returned while 19%
of the cards sent in the mail were used within 60 days; in other
words, cards had a response rate 27 times the response of
applications.129 Not surprisingly, Marine Midland began direct
mailing their cards. 130 Even if the cards were never used, the
bank was able to sell merchants on how many cards were
technically in the hands of potential customers. 131 Marine
Midland was not alone. As noted earlier, an Illinois dominated
Midwest banking coalition was determined to form a rival credit
card network. 132 In their myopic focus on getting cards to their
customers before anyone else did, they spawned a mass mailing
strategy of Biblical proportions, issuing five million cards in a
single month. 133
The initial threshold was low: Any customer without bad
credit would get a card. 134 But their effort was not limited simply
to customers. 135 Under the Illinois Constitution of 1870, branch
banking was banned. The only lessening of that restriction was
made in 1967, which permitted a drive- in facility within 1500
feet of the main bank.136 This geographical limitation led to the
purchase of mailing lists of persons who owned stock, had
expensive cars, membership in certain organizations or clubs,
business owners. . . you get the picture. 137
Unfortunately, no one coordinated this process to
eliminate persons who might appear on more than one of those
lists. 138 A businessman with a new car purchase, stock and a
Id.
Id.
129
Id. at 156-57.
130
Id. at 157.
131
Id.
132
EVANS AND SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 63.
133
Hyman, supra note 37, at 158.
134
Id. at 159.
135
Id.
136
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL & PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,
http://www.idfpr.com/Banks/cbt/STATS/BR-HIST.ASP (last visited Sept. 28,
2013).
137
HYMAN, supra note 37, at 159.
138
Id.
127
128
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prestigious club membership received seven cards on the same
day while another received eighteen cards, including one for each
of his three boys, aged nine to thirteen. 139 At the same time, a
woman received cards from two separate banks; unfortunately,
she had been dead five months. 140 As if giving credit to the dead
were not enough, babies and small children also received cards in
the mail. 141 Federal Reserve Board member Andrew F. Brimmer
explained this at a congressional hearing: “Babies with sizable
savings accounts—frequently opened by grandparents—could
not be distinguished from adults.” 142
If you think that this could not get worse, it does. You see,
the banks also publicized that they were mailing these cards at
the holiday season so that post-office temps, criminals and
perhaps the neighbor you didn’t like, pilfered your mail and post
box. 143 Enterprising criminals also knew the adage “location,
location, location” applied even in crookery, targeting multifamily
homes and apartments where they knew they could collect the
most plastic. 144 Lacking the activation protocols we have today, a
simple forged signature started the spending spree. Bloomberg
estimates losses ranged between $6 million to $12 million, or $43
million to $85 million in 2012 dollars.145
This led to federal law addressing the subject and the
Credit Card Liability Act in Illinois, which states:
No person in whose name a credit card is issued without
his having requested or applied for the card or for the
extension of the credit or establishment of a charge
account which that card evidences is liable to the issuer
of the card for any purchases made or other amounts
owing by a use of that card from which he or a member
of his family or household derive no benefit unless he
has indicated his acceptance of the card by signing or
Id.
SEAN VANATTA SUPRA NOTE 122:, The Great Chicago Christmas
Credit Card Fiasco of 1966: Echoes, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 24, 2012 5:30 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-24/the-great-chicago-christmascredit-card-fiasco-of-1966-echoes.html. ( While Bloomberg’s author thinks this
strange, Chicago has long allowed the dead vote so why not give them credit
cards?).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
139
140
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using the card or by permitting or authorizing use of the
card by another. A mere failure to destroy or return an
unsolicited card is not such an indication.146
Regarding collection actions filed in such instances, the
law required:
When an action is brought by an issuer against the
person named on the card, the burden of proving the
request, application, authorization, permission, use or
benefit as set forth in Section 1 hereof shall be upon
plaintiff if put in issue by defendant. In the event of
judgment for defendant, the court shall allow defendant
a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed as costs. 147
As to liability, the Act held:
Notwithstanding that a person in whose name a credit
card has been issued has requested or applied for such
card or has indicated his acceptance of an unsolicited
credit card, as provided in Section 1 hereof, such person
shall not be liable to the issuer unless the card issuer has
given notice to such person of his potential liability, on
the card or within two years preceding such use, and
has provided such person with an addressed notification
requiring no postage to be paid by such person which
may be mailed in the event of the loss, theft, or possible
unauthorized use of the credit card, and such person
shall not be liable for any amount in excess of the
applicable amount hereinafter set forth. . . 148
For those who were subject to fraud from the shotgun
mailing, the statute limited liability in such actions. If the card
had no signature pane, liability was limited to $ 25.00 and those
with a signature panel to $50.00. Wisely, the practice was banned
entirely by the Unsolicited Credit Card Act of 1977. 149

146
147
148
149

Credit Card Liability Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 145/0.01 (2013).
Credit Card Liability Act, § 145/1.
Credit Card Liability Act, § 145/2.
Credit Card Liability Act, § 150/1.
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XIV. AND NOW. . . THE SUPREMES
The earliest case in the modern credit card era attempting
to discern the nature of the credit card contract took place in
1954. It did not involve consumers or collections but was a
regulatory action. A company called Master Charge (presumably
no relation to what eventually became Master Card) appealed a
ruling that found Master Charge was denied a permit to issue
capital stock because it had not procured a license as a lender
under the Small Loan Law.150 To Master Charge, what it was
doing was nothing like a loan because it was not delivering
money. Under their business plan, for a charge of $ 5.00 per year,
it issued cards to persons deemed to be good credit risks, which
entitled them to purchase, on credit, merchandise or service at
stores, hotels and restaurants listed in its booklet. At the point of
sale, the cardholder would sign an invoice and Master Charge
would agree to purchase, without recourse, at a discount from 6
to 10 percent any of the invoices the listed retailer chose to sell
and assign to it. Master Charge would bill the cardholder for the
face amount of the invoices and the cardholder will pay the
same. 151 Master Charge insisted that a loan of money is a contract
by which one delivers a sum of money to another, and the latter
agrees to return at a future time a sum equivalent to that which
he borrowed. 152 Thereby, a law that could apply only to loans of
money was not intended to apply to loans of credit.
The court would not play semantic games. It upheld the
commissioner’s decision finding that there is no essential
difference between a loan and a sale of credit, so Master Charge
was required to license under the Small Loans Act. 153
While not a Supreme Court case, it is a useful preface
demonstrating that the primary obstacle to creating a universal
card was the assumption that issuers were subject to state law. 154
It would take almost a quarter century for the Supreme Court to
review such perceived limitations. Yet, like so much of the credit
card’s legal history, the fact the case involved a credit card was
tangential to the decision.
In Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha
Service Corp, a unanimous court found state usury laws did not
150
151
152
153
154

Master Charge v. Daugherty, 267 P.2d 821, 822 (Cal. Ct. 1954).
Master Charge, 267 P.2d at 822.
Id.
Id.
EVANS AND SCHAMALENSEE, supra note 32, at 69.
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apply to nationally chartered banks.155 This was First of Omaha’s
second go-around with this argument, having come out the loser
of a similar case in Iowa. While the federal court in that case had
refused to enjoin the card program, the Iowa Supreme Court held
usury laws were applicable. 156 As a piece of trivia, after this loss,
the Omaha hired Robert Bork, Ronald Reagan’s failed Supreme
Court nominee, to argue the instant case before the Supreme
Court.
The First National Bank of Omaha (Omaha Bank) was a
nationally chartered bank located in Nebraska. 157 In the war of
BankAmericard v. Interbank (Visa) it chose to join the
BankAmericard network. 158 Given its proximity to Minnesota,
Omaha Bank solicited for new cardholders in Minnesota. 159 The
Minnesota cardholders they reenrolled were charged the interest
rate permitted by Nebraska law (18%) on unpaid balances. 160
However, this interest rate was in excess of that permitted by
Minnesota law (12%).161 The Marquette National Bank of
Minneapolis (Marquette), a Minnesota-chartered national
banking association, also enrolled in the BankAmericard plan,
brought suit in Minnesota against Omaha Bank to enjoin the
operation of Omaha Bank’s card until such time it complied with
Minnesota’s usury law.162 The trial court rejected Omaha Bank’s
contention that the National Bank Act preempted Minnesota’s
usury law. 163 On appeal, Omaha Bank asserted 12 U. S. C. §85
authorized any national banking association to charge on any
loan interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State where
the bank is located. 164 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed
and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 165
At the outset, Justice Brennan observed Omaha Bank is a
national bank which makes it an instrumentality of the Federal
government, created for a public purpose, and as such is
necessarily subject to the “paramount authority of the United
155
Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299, 319 (1978).
156
Fisher v. First Nat’l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255, 548 (8th Cir. 1977).
157
Marquette Nat’l Bank, 439 U.S. at 301.
158
Id. at 302.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 304.
163
Id. at 306.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 307.
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States,” meaning the interest rate that Omaha Bank could charge
is governed by federal law. 166
Marquette did not disagree Omaha Bank was an entity
whose locus was in Nebraska. 167 Instead, it contended that a
national bank which systematically solicits Minnesota residents
for credit cards to be used in Minnesota merchants must be
considered to be ‘located’ in Minnesota. 168 The court disagreed
with this argument as well, holding that the credit extended was
granted by Omaha Bank in Nebraska, that the finance charges
were assessed by the bank in Omaha, and all payments on unpaid
balances are remitted to the bank in Omaha169 Furthermore, the
bank issued its BankAmericards in Omaha,, after credit
assessments made by the bank in that city. 170
Failing that, the bank attempted to argue Omaha Bank’s
credit card plan adversely affected the marketplace. 171 Justice
Thurgood Marshall was particularly interested in learning how
Marquette could be at a competitive disadvantage when the
competition was charging interest 6% higher than Marquette. 172
When Marquette’s attorney insisted on the point, Marshall
rhetorically asked if other gas station owners would object if its
competitor tripled their price. 173
When the unanimous court finished writing the decision, I
am sure they had no engage in self-congratulation; Brown v.
Board of Education this was not. To them, and I am sure most
legal observers, this was a by-the-numbers application of the
supremacy clause. But, in the world of credit cards, it changed
everything.
Previously, usury laws limited the development of a
national card industry because they limited the bank’s ability to
market their cards nationally, or as you can see from Marquette,
regionally due to the differences in rates. Each state would
require the issuer to administer an entirely different program. 174
166
Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 439 U.S. at 309 (citing Davis v.
Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896)).
167
Id. at 309.
168
Id. at 312.
169
Id. 310-11.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 314.
172
OYEZ , http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_77_1265, MP3
transcript of Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv.
Corp., oral argument, minute 24:10 to 24:20.
173
Id. at minutes 25:20 to 25:29.
174
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 69.
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After Marquette, three major changes occurred. First, nationally
chartered banks began to move from the state they had chartered
in to ones with less restrictive usury laws, such as South Dakota
and Delaware.175 Second, in order to restrain banks from leaving
their states, shedding jobs and tax revenue, states began to
eliminate their usury caps. For example, New York went from
12% caps to complete elimination of caps except for credit cards,
which they allowed to rise to 25%. 176 Finally, with fewer interest
rate differentials, banks could now begin true national massmarketing. 177

XV. DO YOU HAVE ANY CASE LAW FOR THAT?
On the state level, cases involving credit cards were also
running through the system. While certainly not exhaustive or
scientific, a search on Lexis in its state court case database from
1901 to the present shows the first opinion on personal liability on
credit card was in 1960. In Union Oil Company v. Lull, 178 the
defendant was sued by Union for $1,454.25 in charges.
Unfortunately, the charges were unauthorized and Lull claimed
he did not know about the charges until he received his bill on
May 26, 1958 at which time he immediately canceled the card by
telegram. 179
The terms of the card, printed on the back, stated the
account holder guaranteed payment for services or products
rendered “to anyone presenting this card” even if the charges
were unauthorized. 180 Lull claimed he was unaware of the
liability because the manner by which the terms were conveyed
(being on the back of the card) would not lead a cardholder to
suspect they were part of a contract. 181
The court held that Lull’s misconception would not allow
him to escape liability. 182 This is likely because there was some
factual evidence to show Lull knew the card was missing early in
May. However, after an extensive review of the case law, while
the court said the terms could be applied against Lull, it noted
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 70.
Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Lull, 349 P.2d 243, 245 (Or. 1960).
Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 249. Id at 246-47.
Id. at 250.
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Union’s right to recover under the guaranty agreement for
unauthorized purchases was conditioned on Union’s exercise of
reasonable care in making inquiries as to the identity of the
purchaser. 183 As this was a cross-country gas buying spree, the
court was essentially requiring Union to produce cashiers to
testify from each station where the card was used. I’m guessing
Lull won Part II.
In contrast, another identity theft liability case, filed
subsequent to the TILA and Regulation Z had a different
outcome. In Nat’l Commercial Bank & Trust Co. V. Malik, 184 the
bank sued the owner of a store for an act of good customer
service. A customer accidently left a credit card at the
defendant’s store. 185 The storeowner found it and immediately
notified the customer who promised to retrieve the card in six
days. 186 The defendant’s employee agreed to hold the card until
then. 187 Thereafter, the card was used to make $3,304.01 in
unauthorized charges. 188
The bank did not sue their customer, choosing instead to
sue the storeowner, claiming he had wrongfully allowed the card
to fall into possession of an unauthorized user, that the
cardholder had assigned their claims against the storeowner to
the bank, that the loss of the card was occasioned by the owner’s
negligence and breach of an alleged bailment of the card. 189
Relying almost exclusively on TILA, the court noted the
Act places the burden of proof on the issuer to demonstrate they
provided notice of the potential liability of unauthorized use to
the cardholder. 190 In looking to the allegations of the complaint,
the court noted it did not allege compliance with the notice
provisions of TILA. 191 Indeed, notice to merchants is not a part of
TILA, rendering it impossible for the bank to make such a
claim. 192
With the bank arguing it stepped into the cardholder’s
shoes via an assignment, the court analyzed the rest of the
Id. at 253.
Nat’l Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Malik, 72 Misc. 2d 865, 865
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
185
Id. at 866.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 867.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 866-67 (the court cited the notice provisions found in TILA).
183
184
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allegations under that theory. 193 According to basic assignment
law, an assignee receives the same rights as the assignor. 194 In
looking at the dictates of TILA, the court properly noted the
cardholders who lost the card would have had no liability to pay
for the unauthorized uses. 195 Consequently, they would have
suffered no damages. 196 Therefore, “the claims of the plaintiff
assignee. . . are therefore claims without damages.” 197
The first Illinois case examining credit cards appears to be
a criminal matter: People v. Roberts. 198 It is notable for Robert’s
defense which led to an interesting formulation of the credit card
contract. In this case, Roberts was convicted of forgery for
purchasing $3.00 worth of gas with a credit card. 199 The forgery
claim was based on the signed sales slip. 200 He appealed. 201
While admitting he was not the authorized user of the
card and that the signature on the slip was not that of the
authorized user, he asserted the signature was only a deceptive
practice, not forgery and that the slip was not an instrument
capable of defrauding another, language that was a statutory
requirement. 202 Roberts claimed the sales slip, combined with the
credit card itself, may constitute a document but the failure to
allege the existence of a credit card account was fatal to the
indictment. 203 The court disagreed, utilizing the reasoning similar
to a later civil case, Garber v. Harris Trust, holding the credit
card itself simply establishes a line of credit exist while the sales
slip, like a check, purports to make use of the credit. 204

XVI. THE NATURE OF THE CREDIT CARD
As the credit card was beginning to gain popularity, legal
scholars were attempting to use familiar common law notions of
contract and the commercial code to analyze the credit card
contract. As early as 1960, the California Law Review tried,
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Id. at 867.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
People v. Roberts, 27 Ill. App. 3d 489, 490 (3d Dist. 1975).
Id. at 490.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 491-92.
Id. at 492.
Id.
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without success, to fit itself into the existing legal framework of
letters of credit or credit offered by the seller itself. 205 As the
article’s title makes clear, the involvement of a third-party lender
to consumer purchases confounded the legal scholars. As
previously discussed, bank lending for consumer purchases, was
unknown, both from a business or legal perspective. With some
pride, it can be said that Illinois courts were first to answer the
riddle posed in the California Law Review. That is, Illinois
formulated the almost universally accepted definition of the
credit card contract.
In Garber v. Harris Trust, the plaintiff received notice of
the card issuer’s intent to modify the terms of his account. 206
Garber sued, representing a class, asserting the credit card
contract was formed when the card was issued so that the issuers
could not unilaterally change the terms without new
consideration. 207 Harris and other banks in the class maintained
issuance of the card was merely a standing offer to extend
credit. 208 One needed to use the card before there was a
contract. 209 Therefore, the issuers could modify the terms at will
without new consideration.
The court agreed the card itself was a standing offer,
which meant each use of the card is a separate contract governed
by the terms and conditions in place at the time of each use. 210
Because the card is only an offer, the issuer could modify the
terms at will. 211
In dismissing Garber’s claim that issuers were bound to
honor the same terms forever, the court reviewed a basic concept
of contract law: consideration. 212 Garber asserted providing credit
information and submitting to a credit check constituted
consideration. 213 The court found for a performance or a return
promise to constitute consideration, it must be bargained for.214
When you apply for credit, there is no bargaining: if you wanted
205
DONALD H. MAFFLY AND ALEX C. MCDONALD, The Tripartite Credit
Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CAL. L. REV. 459, 461 (1960).
206
Garber v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309, 1310 (Ill. App.
1982).
207
Id.
208
Id. at 1311.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 1312.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 1313.
213
Id.
214
Id.
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the card, you had to submit to those checks.
The court also found there was no mutuality of
obligations.215 If you never use the card, you were not subject to
the terms. 216 Likewise, if the consumer never makes a charge, the
issuer does not have to perform its duties under the contract. 217
With this understanding, the terms, if they were a contract, had
no effective termination date. 218 As such, the cardholder
agreement was a contract of indefinite duration which, by its
nature, was terminable or modifiable at will under long standing
contract law. 219
In fact, the court held modifications could also have a
retroactive effect on balances accrued under the old terms. 220 Any
unpaid balances would be subject to the new terms, but only if
the cardholder uses the card after modifications were sent. 221 By
using the card, the cardholder essentially “refinanced his existing
balance under new arrangement.” 222
Garber was decided almost a quarter century ago.
Notwithstanding its age, Garber has come to be known nationally
as the most reasonable explanation of the formation of a credit
card contract. 223 Indeed, its reasoning provided the basis of
several recent Illinois decisions involving credit card complaint
pleading standards: Portfolio Acquisitions v. Feltman, Asset
Acceptance v. Tyler and Razor Capital v. Antaal. 224

Id.
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 1313-14.
219
Id. at 1314.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 1315.
222
Id. (citing Beck v. First National Bank (Minn 1978) 270 N.W.2d 281)
223
See Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Deutsche Fin. Servs. Corp., 216 F.3d 388, 394
(4th Cir. 2000); Ramirez v. Palisades Collection LLC, (250 F.R.D. 366 (N.D.Ill.
2008); Parkis v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 07 C 410, 2008 WL 94798, 1
(N.D. Ill.2008); Schoppert v. CCTC Int’l, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 444, 447 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Jenkins v. Gen. Collection Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (D. Neb.
2008); Taylor v. First N. Am. Nat’l Bank, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1313 (M.D.
Ala. 2004); Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 309 (Del. Super. 1998); In
re Viva, 414 B.R. 301, 306 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008).
224
Portfolio Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Feltman, 909 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. App. 3d
2009); Asset Acceptance LLC v. Tyler, 966 N.E.2d 1039 (Ill. App.. 3d. 2012)
and Razor Capital v. Antaal, 972 N.E.2d 1238 (Ill. App. 2d 2012).
215
216
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XVII. THE BIGGEST UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF
THEM ALL
Whether or not one believes former Vice President Al
Gore, it may be said with some confidence that Garber made ecommerce possible. By focusing on the act of using the card, not a
physical signature, it enabled us to enter an era where we need
not leave home to engage in trade. The impact of e-commerce is
such that the phrase Black Friday is stated synonymously with its
modern counterpart Cyber Monday, even if ‘cyber’ has fallen out
of favor as the adjective de jour to describe on-line activities.
In 1999, William M. Daley, then head of the Commerce
Department, in a report on the new phenomenon of e-commerce,
stated its promise was a “future with more opportunity for all
Americans.” 225 This statement was made even as the report noted
e-commerce accounted for less than 1% of the economy. 226 Daley
was not far off. In 2012, worldwide e-commerce sales accounted
for $1 trillion dollars in sales. 227 In the U.S. alone, $364 billion in
sales were recorded. 228
The internet as we know it, with portable access via a
mobile device possessing more computing power than the
computers in existence in 1999, would not have occurred without
the creation of the credit card and the cashless society.
Government, in this instance, encouraged its growth with the
passage of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, cleverly going under the acronym of ESIGN. 229
The stated purpose of which was to facilitate the use of electronic
records and signatures in interstate and foreign commerce by
ensuring the validity and legal effect of contracts entered into
electronically.
As you recall in Marquette, some twenty-five years before
E-Sign was passed, made clear national banks were not bound by
state laws regarding usury. Seeing the potential of e-commerce,
WILLIAM M. DALEY, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY II (Jeffrey
Mayer ed. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, June 1999).
226
Id.
227
EMARKETER Ecommerce Sales Topped 1 Trillion for the First Time in
2012 (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Ecommerce-SalesTopped-1-Trillion-First-Time-2012/1009649.
228
Id.
229
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15
U.S.C. § 7001 (2000). It received the acronym E-Sign in
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-7985.htm.
225
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Congress avoided any lag in states amending their laws by
ESIGN explicitly pre-empted state laws to impose uniformity
regarding electronic transactions. 230 The statute also provides that
should a state enact the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(EUTA) a model state law, 231 any deviation was limited to state
statutes meeting certain conditions.232 It specifically forbade
states from adopting EUTA with modifications to force nonelectronic delivery methods for documents or to enact laws giving
greater weight to physical documents over electronic forms. 233
Accordingly, Illinois passed the Illinois’ Electronic Commerce
Security Act, eliminating physical signatures in all statutes save
those that met the limited exceptions found within ESIGN. 234

XVIII. CONCLUSION
Our story began with the understanding that commerce
and credit have been intertwined since before recorded time.
Despite the passage of thousands of years, Aristotle’s concept of
creditors being something unnatural has persisted. Credit cards,
now regulated more strongly by the CFPB and the Card Act,
have been called a drug by some and worse by others. These
extreme views do not help discussions on the causes of our
current financial problems.
Unfortunately, we as humans, suffer what Alan
Greenspan presciently described as “irrational exuberance.” By
that he meant we always seek ways to get rich quickly despite
ample centuries of evidence. In the 17th century, it was the Dutch
and tulips (yes, that is not a typo).235 A century later, it was the
French and the “Mississippi Company” in which the government
invested so much, it crippled the French economy for a
decades. 236 Around the same time, England had to work through

230
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15
U.S.C. § 7002 (2000).
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7002 (2000).
234
Electronic Commerce Security Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 175/1-105
(1999).
235
This unusual investment choice is discussed in detail in MIKE DASH,
TULIPOMANIA : THE STORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST COVETED FLOWER &
THE EXTRAORDINARY PASSIONS IT AROUSED (Random House 2001).
236
FERGUSON, supra note 1, at 139-58.

Starzec Article- Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

11/20/2013 4:07 PM

2013 The Legal History of Credit in Four Thousand Years

139

the South Seas crash. 237 For us, it has been the stock market crash
of 1929, which precipitated the Depression, and more recently the
tech-stock bubble and our most recent real estate bubble.
What makes such bubbles possible in the incredible
interconnectivity of the world economy? Without realizing it, this
interconnectivity touches each of us personally. If you have a
401(k), it is very likely you are investing in a bank that issues
credit cards and want that 401(k) to grow. Growth in stock value
requires profitability and sales, meaning, the bank needs more
credit card customers and more credit card purchases. While no
one likes collection attorneys, if we want the costs of borrowing to
be low and stock prices to remain high, we need creditors and
their attorneys to recover these losses. If done ethically and with
an understanding of the consumer’s circumstances, some good
can come of these efforts, both for the creditor and for the
consumer, as they may, over time, eliminate debt and restore
their credit.
Like anything in life, credit cards can be a boon or, in the
wrong circumstances, be a great evil. It is likely that our natural
fear and distrust of credit has much to do with the instinctive fear
that a change in circumstances can lead to financial ruin. Almost
like the post-war era, in the real estate boom, many of us may
have shed our instinct to plan for the worst. The economy
changes every day and new vehicles of lending and loaning will
always be with us, stepping just ahead of regulation or a true
understanding of the consequences. In the end, it is we, as citizens
and consumers, who must make informed personal choices and
political selections to insure against the turbulence of the modern
economy.

237

Id. at 158.

